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ABSTRACT
The Danish concept of flexicurity in a ‘Golden Triangle’ of low job protection, high income security 
and high employment security is not only about a balance between labor market flexibility and 
social security.  Arguably, it is also a series of more or less stable underlying compromises between 
social partners about the main mechanisms and aims of labor market regulation which – sup-
posedly – should be focused on employment rather than jobs, and competition on quality rather 
than on labor costs. 
However, the ‘Golden Triangle’ – this article argues – seems in need of complementary con-
cepts.  The article therefore introduces,  ‘centralized decentralization’ – a concept that directs our 
attention to forms of flexibility and security primarily for people in work.
Most studies on Danish flexicurity have been carried out under favorable economic conditions. 
In light of the economic slump hitting Denmark in 2008, this article investigates if and how the 
recession challenged these compromises by comparing two rounds of case-based interviews in 
three metalworking companies in 2007 and 2009. 
It is shown that practice has indeed changed – albeit modestly – due to worsened economic 
circumstances. For example the case studies show that the hypothesized preference for external 
numerical flexibility is perhaps too crude as employers use different ways to restructure employ-
ment. Especially the examples of de facto concessionary bargaining to save jobs are important 
here – although the extent of concessions is modest. 
The evidence thus suggests that the ‘Golden Triangle’ flexicurity compromises are indeed 
strained by the economic cycle and that responses to impetus for restructuring are far more nu-
anced than sometimes portrayed. It is argues that more company studies across national labor 
markets and industrial relations institutions will enhance our understanding of the dynamics during 
times of restructuring. 
KEY WORDS
centralized decentralization / collective bargaining / company level / flexicurity / employment 
policy / restructuring
Introduction
For a time, it seemed as though there was no end to the success of the Danish flexicur-ity model. Most prominently, the European Commission has endorsed the concept with Denmark as a primary example of how to achieve a dynamic labor market 
without losing the social security elements. In connection, the Commission has pub-
lished various flexicurity guidelines and principles designed to lead the way for member 
state reforms (Mailand 2009). 
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When the financial crisis hit the Danish real economy in 2008, some scholars 
were, however, critical as to whether the model would only fare well during good times 
(e.g. Tangian 2010). 
In line with van den Berg (2008) and Klindt (2008), this article argues that Danish 
flexicurity model is based on a few fundamental compromises between capital, labor 
and government that also apply to the flexicurity model. Firstly, the acceptance of job 
losses should be inherent in the Danish labor market as unemployment is bolstered by 
income security and employment security. Secondly, high wages and labor standards are 
kept through a coordinated system of collective bargaining and agreements at sector and 
company level which force companies to focus on niches of high value added production 
rather than on labor costs. Thirdly, trade unions take on a partnership approach to bar-
gaining which rests on an obligation to peace in the duration of collective agreements. 
However, with unemployment levels escalating during the current economic crisis 
there is good reason to re-visit these supposed compromises by looking at the practice 
of Danish social partners on the shop floor – a level often neglected in flexicurity studies. 
Surely, if the celebrated Danish flexicurity is to have analytical and political relevance 
in the future it is important that it sustains different economic circumstances. As such, 
the current crisis provides an “unwelcome” test-bed for the model. The article thus at-
tempts to answer the following question: In what ways has the current economic crisis 
challenged the underlying compromises between social partners in the Danish flexicurity 
model at company level? 
In order to answer this broad question, the article begins with a conceptual discus-
sion and outlines the underlying compromises by linking flexicurity with the practice of 
industrial relations at company level. An additional version of Danish flexicurity is pre-
sented which point to a host of possible responses to the impetus of restructuring. Hereby 
the section arrives at different sets of hypotheses about the practice of management and 
company level shop stewards. This is followed by a presentation of the data and methods 
used to examine this practice. Next section examines evidence before and during the 
economic crisis in order to assess the robustness of compromises between social partners 
at company level. Has a change in practice occurred and has it fundamentally altered the 
compromises? Another section then summarizes and discusses findings and it is suggested 
that the underlying compromises inherent in the ‘Golden Triangle’ are indeed strained by 
the economic cycle and that social partners at company level are forced to respond to a 
crisis in various ways. This finding is taken up in the conclusion which points to the pit-
falls of building concepts such as flexicurity based on limited periods of stability. 
Flexicurity
It is worthwhile recalling how flexibility and security – the odd bedfellows – could be 
merged into the concept of flexicurity. 
Flexibility can generally be defined as the ability to adjust labor activities to busi-
ness activities. What we mean by ability is not the personal competences of managers 
but rather the possibility for adjustment. Flexibility is thus a functional term that cap-
tures the possibility of aligning the use of labor to the needs of business activities, be it 
production, service delivery etc. Often – but by far not exclusively – flexibility will serve 
managerial interests (Ibsen & Mailand, 2009). 
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Security can generally be defined as the minimization of social risks. Risk is broadly 
understood here as circumstances that could potentially deteriorate the well-being of 
individuals connected to the labor market. Security is therefore broader than flexibility 
in that it does not presuppose an employment relationship. Security is also a functional 
term that captures the possibility of reducing the probability of circumstances that de-
teriorate the well-being of individuals with connection to the labor market (Ibsen & 
Mailand, 2009).
In the often cited matrix developed by Ton Wilthagen a distinction is made between 
four sub-categories of flexibility and security connected to possibilities for adjustment 
and minimization of risk, respectively (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). 
External numerical flexibility refers to a company’s ability to adjust the intake of la-
bor by hiring and firing which could be hampered by restrictive employment protection 
legislation (EPL) stipulating social/legal obligations connected to redundancies. If regu-
lation is permissive, this could induce companies to take on workers without concern for 
how they will get rid of labor in downturns. Also, the ability to take on workers on fixed 
or temporary contracts is noted as a way of increasing external numerical flexibility. 
Working time flexibility refers to a company’s ability to adjust the use of labor al-
ready working for the company. Not only does this include options for adjusting the 
length, variation and distribution of working time, it also refers to hiring of part timers.
Functional flexibility refers to the workers’ ability to take on wide ranges of tasks 
and responsibilities requiring high levels of multiple skills. This should allow for job ro-
tation, devolution of decision autonomy and thereby flatter organizational structures.
Wage flexibility refers to the company’s ability to make wages variable and con-
tingent upon different parameters such as performance (individual or collective), skill 
attainment or task responsibility.
Job security refers to the ability of workers to stay in the same job as expressed by job 
tenure and is of course closely and inversely related to external numerical flexibility.
Employment security could be said to comprise job security but also refers to the 
ability to find employment generally. While tied to general labor market conditions, em-
ployment security is also connected to policies that enhance employability such as active 
labor market policies together with in-work training and skill development.
Income security refers to protection of stable income levels during transitions in and 
out of employment statuses, e.g. in case of unemployment or during new job situations 
and job content.
Finally, combination security refers to the ability of workers to combine work with 
other phases of life such as parenthood, education or care-taking. This is typically called 
work-life balance. 
Applying the matrix to Danish labor market regulation as seen in figure 1, we find 
that some issues are regulated through statutory provisions and public schemes, some 
through collective agreements and some through company level HR policies. Alongside 
this body of regulation, come EU-directives and agreements that have been implemented 
through collective agreements and additional legislation – usually without causing ma-
jor controversy as Danish labor standards were already in conformity with directives. 
Moreover, some forms of flexibility and some forms of security can said to be exter-
nal or internal, i.e. apply to individuals moving out of jobs and to employees in jobs. The 
point is that different forms of securities relate to different forms of flexibility depending 
on the employment status of the individual. Some securities are designed to cushion the 
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adverse effects of transitions between jobs and some securities apply only when an em-
ployment relationship is in place (Ibsen & Mailand, 2009). The latter will usually be regu-
lated by collective agreements in Denmark as the coverage rate is approximately 75–80 % 
of all employees (Larsen et al. 2010). 
Version 1:  The Golden Triangle
The classic presentation of the Danish flexicurity model is the Golden Triangle (Madsen, 
2006) which can be seen as version 1 of flexicurity in the matrix above. 
Flexicurity scholars subscribing to the ‘Golden Triangle’ have stressed how relaxed 
employment protection legislation and thus high external numerical flexibility is bal-
anced with high spending on active and passive labor market policies which ensure high 
employment and income security (Bredgaard et al. 2009). 
Relaxed employment protection legislation (EPL) should make employers less risk-
averse in hiring labor as they can easily shed it again. The restrictions in Denmark are 
few. Collective agreements at industry level stipulate certain short notice periods for 
production workers according to seniority, while the Law for Salaried Workers de-
termines notice periods for salaried workers. The latter are substantially longer than 
for production workers – begging the question if the ‘Golden Triangle only applies for 
blue-collar workers. Other than that there were no regulatory restrictions to redundan-
cies until 2010 when social partners agreed to a modest severance payment for senior 
workers. 
Flexicurity scholars argue that the ‘Golden Triangle’ has made Danes more at-
tuned to mobility between jobs as they feel secure during transitions due to the com-
prehensive and generous unemployment benefits system (Bredgaard et al 2009). The 
main costs of economic restructuring in other words lie with the state and not the 
individual (Katzenstein, 1987). 
Historically, however, trade unions accepted the managerial prerogative at the work-
place in return for the right to organize workers and the right to collective bargaining 
Figure 1: External and internal versions of flexicurity 
External security provided  
solely by public schemes 
Internal security provided by collective agreements,  
statutory regulation and HR policies 
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Functional  
flexibility
Wage 
flexibility 
Adapted from Bredgaard et al. 2009; Wilthagen & Tros, 2004 
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as a result of the September Compromise in 1899. Indeed, the system is not a product 
of design but of historical compromises along the way and the ‘Golden Triangle’ in its 
now famous setup did not appear until 1990s when the Social Democratic government 
introduced novel elements to the active labor market policies (ALMP). The aims of the 
new policies were on one hand to circumvent the adverse labor supply effects from high 
benefits on employment and on the other hand to facilitate quick mobility and avoid 
bottle neck problems in the labor market (Madsen, 2006). The new ALMP regime as 
such married a social democratic focus on vocational education and training (VET) with 
neo-liberal focus on ‘work-first’ through e.g. activation measures. 
While not a product of a ‘master-design’, the combination of flexibility and security 
is, nonetheless, thought to have contributed to the remarkable labor market performance 
of Denmark in the 1990s and onwards where unemployment was reduced from 12,4 % 
to 3,4 % in 1994-2007 (Statistics Denmark 2009) without incurring massive inflation. 
Some commentators have argued that this policy mix – although not a result of delib-
erate design – has fostered an institutional complementarity which bridges neo-liberal 
and social democratic elements based on social compromises between capital, labor and 
government (Pedersen 2006). 
Danish flexicurity scholars have frequently acknowledged, however, that the impres-
sive record cannot solely be explained by the ‘Golden Triangle’ and that fiscal policies 
and industrial relations must be considered if we are to understand developments since 
the 1990s (Ibsen and Mailand 2009; Madsen 2006). In line with this, both van den Berg 
(2008) and Klindt (2008) have argued that Danish policies during the 1990s to a large 
extent resemble the Swedish Rehn-Meidner (R-M) model which was presented by two 
trade union economists at a LO-congress (union confederation for blue-collar workers) 
in 1951. Klindt (2008) has illustrated the connections of Danish flexicurity policies dur-
ing the 1990s and onwards with the R-M model in the figure below: 
Figure 2: Rehn-Meidner Model adapted to the Danish policies from the 1990s and onwards
Employers  can easily  
restructure  organisation  and 
have  less  hesitation  in hiring    
Low  job  protection    and 
flexible    working    time 
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Adapted from Klindt (2008)
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The R-M model – designed for post-war Sweden in the 1950s – entails a policy similar 
to the Danish flexicurity version 1 aiming at full employment, high economic growth, 
price stability and fair and egalitarian wages (Erixon, 2008). Contrary to much 
post-war economic thinking, the policies are not based on Keynesian demand-stim-
uli as price stability is put at the core of the model through a restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policy under normal business activity. Instead, fiscal and monetary policies 
can only be used selectively to counter severe depressive tendencies in the economy. 
As Klindt (2008) argues, this actually was the policy of Danish governments during 
the 1990s.
R-M model also prescribes egalitarian wage setting through centralized collective 
bargaining which ensures equal pay for equal jobs and unequal pay for unequal jobs 
according to skill levels. The egalitarian wage setting and the restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policies will moreover squeeze profit margins and force unproductive com-
panies to either go out of business or rationalize, i.e. an element of ‘creative destruc-
tion’. Conversely, very productive companies are expected to refrain from paying 
excessive wages due to the centralized wage setting, hereby off-setting inflationary 
wage-spirals. 
R-M and ‘Golden Triangle’ resemble each other when it comes to the role of 
mobility and ALMP. R-M envisions that mobility between jobs is essential to keep 
the aim of full employment and anti-inflation. ALMP such as retraining, vocational, 
education and relocation grants together with matching actions (primarily public 
information services) and as noted above targeted demand-oriented policies to in-
crease demand for labor in certain regions, industries and firms shall furthermore 
facilitate mobility. If wage-setting is not to be the main allocator of labor, then ALMP 
will (Erixon, 2008; Klindt, 2008). Mobility is – as noted – cushioned by income secu-
rity in job transitions, i.e. high unemployment benefits, again resembling the ‘Golden 
Triangle’ in theory.
Version 2: Centralized Decentralization
While the similarities between flexicurity and the R-M model pointed out by van den 
Berg and Klindt seem warranted, there are important differences that reside in version 
2 of internal flexicurity as depicted in figure 1: Centralized decentralization1 (Due et al. 
1993). 
As noted, the elements of version 2 are by and large regulated through collective 
agreements the contents of which have gradually been decentralized to the workplace in a 
centralized manner. Klindt (2008) notes that this process took place for wages in the 1990s 
as mandatory wage-rates were turned into minimum levels – albeit at internationally high 
levels – thus giving some form of in-work income security (Ibsen & Mailand, 2009). 
Only approximately 15 % of private sector employment covered by collective agreements 
have wage levels set in central agreements. The rest have either minimum wage systems or 
figureless agreements (DA, 2009). 
Klindt moreover argues that Danish wage-determination de facto resembles the 
Swedish ideal for egalitarian wage-setting in the R-M model by following the pat-
tern set by the key bargaining manufacturing sector. However, it is important to note 
that the flexible wage systems in Denmark – not least for white-collar workers with 
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figureless agreements – give considerable wage flexibility that was not envisioned in 
the R-M model. As a minimum, the abolition of any upper-limit to local wage deals as 
of 1993 means that high-productivity companies run the risk of inflating wages, but 
downward wage flexibility is de facto also part of the system as the minimum wage 
levels are far below the actual wages. 
Another essential difference is the considerable decentralization of working time 
and the equally important elimination of job demarcations in especially manufactur-
ing. These internal forms of flexibility have been successfully pursued by employers 
during sector level bargaining rounds of the last couple of decades in an exchange for 
the establishment of pension funds, maternity/parental leave funds and improved VET 
rights. As such, pension, leave and VET rights/funding comprise the security elements 
of version 2 – income, combination and employment security, respectively (Ibsen & 
Mailand, 2009). 
Staying with the flexicurity matrix, version 2 provides high working time flexibility 
which on top of enhancing productivity also is used to curb labor costs as employers 
avoid expensive overtime pay. Employees, on the other hand, have greater freedom to 
organize their working time, thus increasing combination security. 
Similarly, functional flexibility has been taken on by DI (Confederation of Danish 
Industries) through a series of agreement modernizations that eliminate job demar-
cations and thus feeds into productivity enhancing work re-organization (Kristensen, 
2006). The focus on VET by unions should be seen in line with these changes. 
The development of centralized decentralization resides not only in minimum lev-
els from sector agreement but also comprise an institutional and cultural reproduction 
of collective bargaining at the workplace level (Due et al. 1993). Local shop stewards 
are put in charge of bargaining wage, working time and VET provisions with manage-
ment in local agreements and they are often highly involved in quasi-managerial deci-
sions involving work organization, VET-plans and thus productivity enhancements 
(Kristensen, 2006). It follows that decentralized bargaining opens for the possibility, 
that flexicurity balances are determined by local bargaining parties and the institu-
tions framing local bargaining (Nergaard et al. 2009). This in turn puts pressure on 
local parties to reach innovative agreements that take various interests into account in 
a balanced way (Regalia 2006).
The activities of shop stewards – both bargaining and cooperation – are however 
carried out according to a partnership approach with management in which there is 
no right to industrial action. According to the Basic Agreement between the labor and 
employer confederations, LO and DA, and the Law on Mediation, the right to industrial 
action only applies for renewal or establishment of collective agreements at the sector 
level, not for local bargaining when the company is already covered by a collective 
agreement. 
In sum, the flexicurity concept – in the multifaceted sense used here – forces us to 
look at the host of interplays between flexibility and security inherent in the Danish 
labor market regulation. As a corollary, employers and shop stewards have a panacea of 
options in how they chose to react to economic forces demanding restructuring. Some – 
in line with in the ‘Golden Triangle’ – pertain to external numerical flexibility, i.e. shed-
ding labor with cost of restructuring to a large extent being covered by the state through 
unemployment benefits and ALPM. Others will pursue internal forms of flexibility with 
cost of restructuring being borne in the main by the individual worker. 
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Bridging the two versions of flexicurity is the use of subsidized work share and 
retraining options in which the state bears the larger part of costs while the individ-
ual workers and the employer share the costs until the economic conditions change 
for the better. Shop stewards are involved in negotiating the arrangements that 
can be used to forestall redundancies but only for a limited period of 13 weeks2 
using the unemployment benefits to top-up reduced earnings due to reduced working 
time. 
Expectations to practice of social partners during crisis
Following Version 1 of ‘Golden Triangle’ and its Rehn-Meidner analogy, social part-
ners at company level can be expected to react to an impetus for restructuring in 
a number of ways, thus revealing the underlying social compromises at company 
level. 
If Version 1 flexicurity rests on stable compromises, we would expect company 
level practices during an economic crisis to accord with this flexicurity logic: 
The main method of restructuring is through external numerical flexibility, i.e. re-1. 
dundancies, as opposed to wage and working time flexibility. 
Continued union acceptance of few restrictions and thus low costs of hiring and 2. 
firing. 
Unions will refrain from concessionary bargaining on terms and conditions, espe-3. 
cially wages and working time. As noted above, cost of structural adjustment in the 
economy lies with the state. 
We would expect unions to adhere to the peace obligation during collective agree-4. 
ments and not resort to illegal strikes against proposed redund ancies. 
Version 2 flexicurity, however, invites to more varied responses to the impetus for re-
structuring involving internal forms of flexibility that may complement (5 & 7) or go 
counter to the above mentioned practices (6): 
Functional flexibility and productivity enhancing measures are used to increase com-5. 
petitiveness, save orders and jobs. 
To cut labor costs and save jobs, unions make concessions through wage-freezes or 6. 
even wage cuts.
Working time flexibility (subsidized or not) is used to cut labor costs. 7. 
Looking at the specific actions of social partners at the company level should reveal 
whether the present crisis as such has had any impact on the types of responses to re-
structuring, and the case studies will therefore show if practice and thus the robustness 
of compromises depend on the specific external pressures due to the crisis – and not 
on the logic of version 1 flexicurity. Similarly, according to Version 2, we would expect 
unions to have a much more pragmatic bargaining strategy including concession bar-
gaining when attempting to safeguard jobs (Léonard 2004).
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Finally, there is the possibility that unions are in such dire circumstances that they 
will depart from the compromises inherent in both versions 1 and 2 and resort to what 
we can call anti-flexicurity behavior to safeguard jobs:
Unions use illegal industrial action to combat plans of redundancies. 8. 
Unions claim stricter job protection regulation.9. 
methods and Data
The article brings together two analyses at company level that combined give an over-
view of the practice of social partners before and during the present crisis. 
The analysis at company level is based on two rounds of qualitative semi-structured 
interviews before (in 2007) and during the current crisis (in 2009) with shop stewards in 
three major Danish metalworking companies – in the following called A, B and C. This 
was combined with a few clarifying interviews with managers in one company (A) and 
background interviews with union officials on union strategies towards restructuring. In 
total, 16 persons were interviewed. The semi-structured interviews were focused around 
four kinds of responses to redundancies: Employer practice of restructuring employment, 
demands for stricter job protection regulation and redundancy terms, concessionary bar-
gaining on terms and conditions of employment and finally industrial action against re-
dundancies. These categories were used to code the interview transcripts in NVIVO. 
Interview data were combined with documentary material on employment figures 
and redundancy procedures which was given by informants or obtained through com-
pany headquarters. 
All companies had experienced redundancies but for different reasons. In 2007, re-
dundancies were mainly motivated by relocation of production to other countries, while 
in 2009 redundancies were more directly linked to negative economic circumstances. 
Since, considerable restructuring of employment had occurred both in 2007 and 2009 
it is possible to compare practice of social partners during restructuring and thus the 
flexicurity compromises for both periods. 
Compromises before and during the crisis 
Before proceeding to the actual analyses it is instructive to get an idea – albeit rough 
and preliminary – about the kind of pressure the proposed flexicurity compromises came 
under when the present crisis hit Denmark. Although an account of the possible reasons 
for the specific impact of the crisis on the Danish economy is far beyond the scope of this 
article, it seems, nonetheless, well established that 1) Denmark was in a very favorable 
economic situation at the outset of the crisis 2) Denmark was one of the first European 
countries to be hit; 3) the negative impacts have been relatively more severe on key socio-
economic indicators than in other Northern-European countries and 4) the bounce back 
of the Danish economy (in terms of growth) has been somewhat slower than in other 
countries (Finansministeriet 2009). 
It could be argued that the economy in Denmark was already slowing down in 2007 
with modest real GDP growth rates. However, the 2009 figures in table 1 reveals the overall 
magnitude of the crisis with a -4,9 % drop in real GDP (the EU-27 dropped from 2,9 % 
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to -4,2 %). What is moreover remarkable for Denmark is the rapid rise in unemploy-
ment and not so much the level of unemployment which in 2009 was still relatively low 
by European standards as can also be seen in the table. When comparing to for example 
Germany and Sweden, Danish unemployment rates have increased sharply from 4,1 % 
in the last month of 2008 when recession hit Denmark to 7,2 the same time next year. 
In Germany and Sweden, the increase in this period has been from 7,1 % to 7,6 % 
and from 7,0 % to 8,9 %, respectively (Eurostat 2010). Note that these figures should 
be viewed with some caution as many German workers were placed on work-share 
schemes (Andersen 2010). 
While it might seem natural that Denmark, with record-breaking low unemploy-
ment rates in the second quarter of 2008, has experienced more rapid increases in un-
employment, the parallel sharp decline in Danish employment justifies some concern. 
According to a recent analysis, employment has fallen by 4,5 % from the 3rd quarter 
2008 to 3rd quarter 2009. Thus, in this period some 104.200 full time employed have 
exited employment, and since “only” 59.200 of these are registered as unemployed this 
means that 45.000 have effectively left the labor market all together (Arbejderbevægels-
ens Erhvervsråd 2009).
As in other countries, unemployment has hit blue-collar (skilled and unskilled) 
workers in construction (business cycle sensitive) and manufacturing (export-oriented) 
first and hardest. As an indication of how employment in metalworking was affected, 
table 2 shows unemployment rates according to union membership and thus occupa-
tional groups, in 2008 and 2009.
Table 1 GDP-growth and unemployment rates before and during the crisis
2007 (yearly averages) 2009 (yearly averages)
Denmark EU-27 Denmark EU-27
Real GDP growth rate 1,7 2,9 -4,9 -4,2
Unemployment rate (ILO-def.) 3,8 7,1 6,0 8,9
Source: Eurostat, 2010
Table 2 Unemployment rates according to union/occupation in manufacturing
December 2008 December3 2009 
1. 3F - Unskilled workers 5,2 10,1
2. Dansk Metal - Skilled workers 2,0 4,0
3. HK - Salaried workers/Clerks 2,2 7,7
4. TL - Technicians 2,5 7,4
5. TIB – Craftsmen 5,2 10,8
6. EL - Electricians 0,9 5,2
Sources: CO-Industri 2010
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In Danish manufacturing, an approximated total of 66.000 jobs were lost since the 
recession hit in the second quarter of 2008 (Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd 2010), 
reflecting a drop in production levels from late 2008 to late 2009 of 22,6 %. As can 
be seen in table 2, only the skilled workers kept their buoyancy, but even these groups 
suffered important redundancies and doubled their unemployment rate. Unemployment 
figures from 3F (United Federation of Danish Workers) furthermore showed that un-
skilled manufacturing union members had similar unemployment rates as their peers in 
construction around 12 % into 2010 (www.3f.dk). 
This considerable drop in production levels also had a discernable effect on local 
wage developments4. In 2007, Danish manufacturing wages grew by 4,6 % while in 
2009 the increase had dropped to 3,8 % which is still relatively high compared to oth-
er European countries (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening 2010). The wage-growth reflects 
the rather generous wage agreements struck before the crisis hit. DI, however, reported 
that 25 % of member companies negotiated wage freezes in local wage negotiations 
for 2009 (DI 2009).
In a similar vein, work share arrangements were put in place touching some 30.000 
Danish employees between January and September 2009 – most of these were in manu-
facturing (Andersen, 2010).
Strained compromises at company level?
In order to give indications of what is happening to the flexicurity compromises at com-
pany level this section analyses two rounds of company level restructuring in 2007 and 
2009 in three major metalworking companies. In the following each company is given 
a letter: A, B, C. 
All three companies were in 2007 relatively large companies for Danish standards, 
producing both components and assembling them for upscale product markets. This, 
however, changed dramatically for company C, because the production of components 
was being relocated. This was less the case in A and B which in despite of relocation 
retained production of components in Denmark. The results are summarized in the table 
below. 
2007
Employer practices of restructuring employment evidently vary somewhat depending 
on the business cycles, but as already noticed; employment restructuring was needed in 
both periods for all three companies – albeit at different levels. 
In A, some 600-700 jobs had been relocated during the period of 2001-2007 and 
the company employed approx. 22.000 worldwide in 2007. In B the actual number 
of relocated jobs was unknown to the informant but the company employed approx. 
16.000 worldwide in 2007. In 2007 the scale of relocation in companies A and B 
was at a level where comprehensive schemes for in-house redeployment, normal la-
bor turnover and early retirement plans could be used to alleviate some of the nega-
tive employment effects of relocation, hereby reducing the number of redundancies. 
These internal employment restructurings demanded high functional flexibility on 
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the part of the employees who often needed retraining to perform new tasks in the 
production line. In total, there were very few forced redundancies as a result of the 
relocations, which also reflected constant new orders and new production lines in A 
and B. This was less so the case in company C which was also troubled by reductions 
in market shares. During the period of 2002-2007 the plant in question had gone 
from employing 1.200 workers to 350. Thus the scope of restructuring meant that 
redundancies were needed when possibilities for redeployment and early retirement 
had been exhausted which in turn had a significant impact on the choices unions were 
faced with.
Concessionary bargaining on wages was nonetheless absent in all three companies 
despite the varying pressures on employment. Local wage bargaining remained intact 
with substantial supplements negotiated each year. In accordance, attempts by manage-
ment to use the threat of relocation to pressure wages were thwarted by shop stewards – 
even in C. The general union view was to remain firm in local bargaining and not en-
ter into international labor cost competition. Resistance was also facilitated by cross-
company communication among shop stewards to coordinate wage demands vis-à-vis 
management. Despite relocations, the three companies thus followed suit on the general 
wage increases in Denmark during the economic boom of 2007. More importantly for 
our purposes, the 2007 answers also reflected a high feeling of employment security 
and income security due to the general employment situation and the active and passive 
labor market policies in the flexicurity version 1. 
Nevertheless, C did negotiate a new deal on working time which increased the 
weekly average working time to 42 hours during peaks in production. This was done 
in a mutual attempt to improve productivity as the factories had been falling behind. 
According to the shop stewards at C, the threat of relocation somewhat pushed shop 
stewards into this agreement, but the add-on wage connected to a 42 h/week also 
helped. 
Despite the peace obligation, trade unions have sometimes accepted the 
collective fine to unions given for illegal industrial action in order to reverse manage-
rial decisions or to express discontent in general. This is reflected in work stoppages in 
breach of the collective agreements of which there were 768 in 2007 (69.094,9 work 
days lost) – a relatively high number due to the collective bargaining round of that year, 
which always sparks illegal strikes. 
However, this was not the case in any of the three companies as shop stewards 
viewed the measure as futile and poor compared to dialogue about how to counter the 
negative consequences of restructuring. Some employees in company A had attempted 
to mobilize work stoppage in protest with management, but this was quickly thwarted 
by shop stewards who reminded their colleagues of the peace obligation. Indeed, shop 
stewards are obliged to do so according to the Basic Agreement. Similar employee 
discontent had surfaced in B and C, but in both cases without any direct attempts to 
stop work. 
Interviews in 2007 revealed that – beyond their legal obligations – shop stewards 
preferred a partnership approach to handling redundancies and made reference to the 
high unemployment insurance benefits but also to the possibilities of alternative employ-
ment either in-house or in the region. Industrial action as an expression of frustration and 
discontent and as strategy to reverse decisions by management was therefore irrelevant 
when shop stewards weighed their options. 
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Turning to redundancy terms, the scope for action at company level might seem 
limited at first sight as noted above. Nonetheless, shop stewards are free to negotiate 
local agreements on the terms of redundancies, including redundancy payments, longer 
notice periods and extra training for redundant workers during the notice period. Argu-
ably, redundancy payments will directly infringe upon the external numerical flexibility 
as it increases the cost of firing for companies, while extra training has a more indirect 
impact since courses typically involves public subsidies or funds from the Educational 
Funds set up in 2007. Rather, therefore, extra training would be a cost for companies as 
workers are taken out of work during the notice period – this of course depending on 
the actual demand for the labor of these workers. 
Regarding redundancy payments, interviews in 2007 reflected the different pres-
sures on employment. In company A no serious attempts were made by shop stewards to 
get enhanced redundancy payments as the focus was squarely set on moving employees 
into new positions within the company, or – as a last port of call – into other companies 
in the region. 
The picture was different in company B and C where senior production workers 
had been given redundancy payments when relocated jobs could not be absorbed into 
new positions. Here, shop stewards were successfully engaged in negotiating favorable 
redundancy payments to senior production workers – similar to a “Golden Handshake” 
for long faithful service to the company. In a situation where work morale was under 
heavy pressure from growing job insecurity, management was not unrelenting in conced-
ing to this. 
Regarding extra training the companies differed slightly according to their specific 
relocation procedures. In company A, training was often not part of the relocation pro-
cess as employees were busy co-managing the move of jobs abroad. Indeed, shop stew-
ards would then negotiate six months longer notice periods for redundant workers to 
alleviate the risk of there being no job opening after the relocation process was done. Ac-
cording to the informant in A, training in connection to relocation should rather be seen 
as a continuous part of constant moving of employees into new positions, underlining 
the need for high functional flexibility of workers. In company B and C, shop stewards 
would make training available for workers – either for in-house re-employment (in B) or 
to prepare workers for job-hunting when the notice period was over (in C). In company 
C, shop stewards and management formalized procedures for training connected to 
redundancies in a local agreement whereby any disagreements on the shop floor could 
be swept away. 
2009 
Employer practice of restructuring employment shifted between the three companies in 
2009 as companies A and B came under severe pressure to reduce labor costs through 
various means in order to curb the negative effects of declining orders. Company C on 
the other hand was less under pressure as the massive restructuring process had already 
been under way and it needed to make fewer cuts in staff which evidently affected the 
dynamics during the crisis. Nonetheless, all three companies were hit by redundancies. 
As in 2007, the initial actions to curb negative employment effects were centered on 
redeployment of staff and early retirement which for the former meant higher demands 
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for functional flexibility. However, the scale of falling production orders due to a market 
in recession soon called for more drastic measures. 
In Denmark management and shop stewards can agree to transfer large shares of 
production workers to state subsidized work share programs in which working time 
is reduced for either the entire company or an entire department. The employee will 
be compensated up to the capped unemployment insurance benefit level at approx. 
DKK 15.500 (€ 2.010) a month. The program can be used for up to 13 weeks during 
12 months with possibility for further extension. 
In company A, some 1.300 workers (skilled and unskilled) were touched by such a 
work share scheme, during which they could not be made redundant. This did not, how-
ever, relieve the pressure to lay off workers, and at the time of the interview (October 
2009) approximately 650 workers had been given notice of redundancy in two major 
rounds. In the first round, some 200 workers, many of which were temporary work-
ers and unskilled, were made redundant. This was followed by a second round where 
many salaried workers (roughly 400) and some production workers (50) who were not 
in work share schemes were made redundant. Globally, the company now employed 
17.000 persons in 2009 compared to approximately 18.000 in 2008. 
In company B, however, efforts to curb redundancies through work share, was 
abandoned after a few weeks, when the severity of the crisis was realized. Layoff of 
workers then started with relocation to Mexico of approximately 50 jobs. This was fol-
lowed by several notified rounds of redundancies of between 30-80 jobs. In total, some 
400 production workers were made redundant at the plant in question adding to the 
layoff of 150 salaried workers. At the time of the interview (October 2009), production 
staff had been reduced from 1.300 workers to approximately 900 in the plant. Globally, 
employment in the company had been reduced by 20 % and was now at approximately 
26.000 employees. 
In company C – as noted above – employment had already been significantly re-
duced during recent years bringing the required labor “slimming” to a minimum. In to-
tal, only 25 employees had been made redundant while 90 had been put on work share 
to safeguard their jobs. The company had now been split up so figures mentioned here 
exclusively refer to the plant in question. 
Did the rather bleak situation translate into concessionary bargaining? Interviews 
suggest that the approach on local bargaining for production workers followed the line 
of 2007 despite the much heavier pressures on employment. The picture is slightly dif-
ferent for salaried workers.
In company A, no concessions were made on wages as shop stewards were aiming for 
increases as usual – albeit with lower expectations than in 2007. Cuts in wages or wage 
freezes were out of the question according to the interviews. Similarly, no new working 
time arrangements had been introduced – apart from the work share program. 
In company B, management suggested to their production workers to forgo already 
agreed wage increases to preserve employment, but this was rejected by shop stew-
ards on the grounds that cuts in costs should be found elsewhere. Production workers 
had suffered enough and the general feeling was that wage concessions would not save 
threatened jobs anyway. Indirectly, salaried workers were giving concessions as they in-
dividually agreed to spend unpaid vacation – a de facto wage concession. This was done 
without shop stewards’ consent. Management in addition to this dictated a wage-freeze 
for salaried workers who to a larger degree bargain individually on wage supplements. 
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Concerning working time, production workers in company B had shifted from a 3-shift 
schedule to only one shift, reflecting reduction in orders. This meant a de facto wage 
reduction as shift premiums were forgone. 
In company C, local wage bargaining was not affected by the crisis for production 
workers. Shop stewards resisted calls – albeit feeble – by management for concessions. 
As in company B, the case was different for salaried workers who agreed or rather 
accepted a wage-freeze in face of falling revenue for the company. On working time, no 
further concessions were made as the 42 hour/week in peaks was maintained. 
Due to the increased pressure on employment in the three companies, it might be 
expected that shop stewards and union members would change their stance on indus-
trial action to counter redundancies. As noted above, while the peace obligation makes it 
punishable to strike when collective agreements are in force, industrial actions have been 
carried out in the past to show discontent with managerial decisions. In contrast to the 
situation in 2007 when frustration was curbed by arguments about high income security 
and alternative employment possibilities, shop stewards’ attitude towards management 
had changed in a negative direction – a consequence of the often stressful task of manag-
ing massive restructuring. 
Interviewees in all three companies, nonetheless, reported an unchanged approach 
to work stoppages as this was still considered a futile strategy vis-à-vis the proposed re-
dundancies. It would seem that the partnership approach to restructuring had been main-
tained through the crisis despite the cooling off in union-management relationships. 
Turning to redundancy terms, the shop stewards in company A were successful in 
getting extra redundancy payments for senior workers with an additional aim of miti-
gating the negative sentiments in the workforce. In B, the attempt was unsuccessful and 
redundant workers were left with standard notice periods. Shop stewards gave no im-
mediate reasons for why attempts failed. In company C, there were no attempts as the 
workers who were made redundant typically had low seniority with the company. This 
point underlines that extra redundancy payments are usually given to senior employees. 
While practice on redundancy payments differed, there was a common strategy 
in all companies to provide extra training during notice periods as an instrument to 
upgrade the skills of primarily unskilled production workers. However, any relevant 
funds – either public or from the educational funds of social partners – had been ex-
hausted to satisfy the massive demand during the crisis. 
In company A, management was hesitant to use notice periods for training and shop 
stewards had to fight to get permissions. Management in company B had been more pro-
active despite the substantial work needed to set up courses. However, the interviewees 
in A and B with regret noted that courses served as a “parking space” for redundant 
workers during their notice period rather than actually improving their skills. In C, the 
company’s own educational funds ran out due to the massive need. Here, shop stewards 
were successful in putting redundant workers on public courses during the notice peri-
ods thereby enabling workers to receive full pay during the course.
Discussion of findings
Admittedly, the findings reported here (see the summary table above) are not representa-
tive of the metalworking sector as a whole, let alone of the entire Danish labor market. 
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In order to broaden the perspective somewhat the above findings are therefore discussed 
in relation to general industrial relations developments in 2007 and 2009/10. This will 
give a better idea of the relative robustness of flexicurity compromises during the two 
periods and show the interconnections between local and central levels. 
At a glance the two rounds of interviews do show a shift in practice on some of the 
dimensions which backs the overall hypothesis that practice at company level reflects 
the immediate employment situation in each company. However, there was also evidence 
of stable practice despite the different pressures stemming from changed economic cir-
cumstances. The most important changes were in 1) employer practice, 2) concessionary 
bargaining to save employment and 3) redundancy terms.
Concerning the first, clearly the dramatic drop in labor demand changed the practice 
of in-house re-employment in A and B to heavier reliance on external numerical flexibility. 
This does however not contradict the flexicurity compromise – on the contrary since flex-
ible hiring and firing is one of the key pillars in the ‘Golden Triangle’. Redundancies were, 
however, combined with extensive use of work share in company A and C, while this was 
abandoned in B where external numerical flexibility was deemed unavoidable. This shows 
that managements in Denmark use a host of practices – both internal and external – to 
adjust the labor force to demand. Seen in isolation this does somewhat contradict the 
Version 1 flexicurity hypothesis that external numerical flexibility is the preferred option. 
However, when compared for example to German use of short-time working – which was 
approximately 1,4 million workers in June 2009 out of 43,6 millions economically active 
(approx. 3,2 %) – the Danish take-up of the option – approx. 30.000 workers between 
January and September 2009 out of 2,8 millions economically active (approx. 1 %) – 
seems rather modest given comparable drops in production levels in the two countries. 
Note also that the maximum period in Germany is up to 24 months compared to the 
maximum of 26 weeks in Denmark. This is perhaps an indication of the different practice 
of external versus internal flexibility in the two countries (Andersen, 2010) and thus gives 
support to practices according to Version 1 flexicurity compromises.
Concerning the second change – concessionary bargaining – the picture is also 
mixed, albeit with some identical patterns. Firstly, production workers retained the 
bargaining strategy as usual despite managerial pressures to cut wages. This was re-
sisted with reference to the burdens this group had already taken through massive and 
earlier redundancies. Conversely, salaried workers accepted wage freezes more or less 
voluntarily to safeguard jobs, reflecting their longer notice periods but perhaps more 
importantly their relatively more individualized pay setting. Indeed, one would expect 
that the two occupational groups’ attitudes to concessionary bargaining differ. It is also 
worth remembering how decentralization also involves a reproduction of centralized 
bargaining at workplace level. Here, the shop stewards of production workers will be 
more adamant to downward wage flexibility while individual salaried workers will be 
on their own devices vis-à-vis management. The cases thus underline the impact of local 
collective representation during times of restructuring. 
A second variant of concessionary bargaining includes the work share schemes 
which can be viewed as a subsidized concession on working time, albeit with income 
security. Finally, company B changed from 3-shifts to 1 shift working to safeguard jobs 
which actually means a reduction in earnings due to loss of shift premiums. 
When looking at aggregate figures for local wage bargaining one finds that approxi-
mately 25 % of DI-member companies (the main employer confederation) negotiated 
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wage freezes in local wage negotiations in 2009. However, the average yearly wage in-
creases in private sector employment only dropped modestly between the two periods as 
noted above. As such, the average increases are still quite high relative to other countries’ 
wage increases, indicating a relative stickiness in Danish wages, perhaps due to already 
agreed increases together with local wage bargaining resilience. 
The level of wage increases in sector level bargaining changed considerably when 
social partners in the manufacturing industry agreed to very modest wage increases in 
the 2010 two-year agreement that presumably only barely will maintain real wages in 
the subsequent local wage agreements. However, these modest wage levels can hardly be 
seen as concessionary bargaining but rather as a ‘normal’ adjustment to the bargaining 
powers of the trade unions vis-à-vis employers during times of high unemployment. To 
sum up, the third flexicurity compromise about concessionary bargaining seems to have 
been partly strained at company level as some groups have accepted either direct or in-
direct concessions on wages and working time. Collective agreements allow this as part 
of ‘centralized decentralization’ in framework provisions on wage and working time and 
the actual balance is left to shop stewards and their bargaining powers locally. 
Finally, practice of redundancy terms also seemed to have been affected by the 
changed circumstances. Although the strategies of getting enhanced redundancy pay-
ments and extra training was present in both periods, shop stewards were much more 
involved in these endeavors in 2009 due to the increasing number of redundancies. 
Both in a direct way (redundancy payments) and indirectly (extra training) this practice 
increases the cost of external numerical flexibility albeit in varying degrees. However, 
in many instances extra training can be subsidized and redundancy payments were al-
most exclusively given to senior employees as a “Golden Handshake” for long service. 
Furthermore, in company B and C extra redundancy payments were not conceded by 
management despite union efforts. Nonetheless, the union practices in this respect do go 
somewhat counter versions 1 and 2. 
As noted in the above section, notice periods for production workers are typically 
stipulated in collective agreements at industry level. It is therefore instructive to men-
tion the additional redundancy payment for senior employees, that was agreed upon in 
the 2010 agreements of manufacturing – a direct response to calls from union members 
and shop stewards demanding more security as a consequence of the crisis. The provi-
sion tops up unemployment benefits thereby securing redundant workers a replacement 
rate of 85 % the first month for workers with three years employment; two months for 
employees with six years employment and three months for employees with eight years 
employment. 
Arguably, this innovation touches upon the external numerical flexibility since costs 
of firing are internalized in the companies – albeit in a rather modest way. However, 
comments by trade union officials indicate aims to enhance this payment should parlia-
ment fail to enhance the statutory unemployment benefits which at the moment stand 
at a replacement rate of approximately 50-55 % for an average Danish skilled worker. 
This indicates that income security for the time being is perceived as too low which 
could jeopardize union acceptance of permissive hiring and firing and thus the ‘Golden 
Triangle’ flexicurity compromise. Alternatively, the provision could be seen as an inno-
vative way to ensure income security in times of political stalemate. 
What has not changed between the periods is the reluctance to use industrial action 
to prevent redundancies. While not surprising in general because of the peace obliga-
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tion during collective agreements, general figures confirm a considerable drop in illegal 
strikes during recent years. Overall, 2009 saw the lowest figures of company level strikes 
in breach of the collective agreement since reporting started in 1991. As such, the part-
nership approach prevails despite changing economic circumstances – indeed it can be 
argued that unions will be more appeasing during economic slumps due to reduced bar-
gaining power (Hibbs Jr. 1976). Indeed, the 2010 collective bargaining round was con-
cluded with an appeasing yes in the union ballot despite very modest wage increases. 
It seems clear that the proposed compromises of version 1 are indeed strained both 
at company and national level as social partners try to steer clear of the crisis. None-
theless, changes are not uniform but contingent upon the immediate issues at hand 
for management and shop stewards. As such, the responses in the three companies are 
piecemeal and pragmatic according to the various possible practices in both versions 1 
and 2 flexicurity. 
Conclusion
The article tries to identify four so-called flexicurity compromises between social part-
ners hereby linking the “Golden Triangle” to industrial relations. These were 1) a mana-
gerial preference for external numerical flexibility when restructuring the workforce, 2) 
union acceptance of ease of hiring and firing, 3) unions refraining from concessionary 
bargaining and 4) unions refraining from industrial action to counter restructuring and 
instead choosing a partnership approach. 
However, the article also argued that flexicurity in Denmark also includes 
internal forms of flexibility and security that are equally important when employers and 
shop stewards have to respond to the impetus of restructuring. These include 5) func-
tional flexibility, 6) wage flexibility and 7) working time flexibility. 
By comparing two rounds of case-based interviews in three metalworking compa-
nies in 2007 and 2009, respectively, it was shown that practice has indeed changed – 
albeit modestly – due to worsened economic circumstances. The interviews showed 
that the hypothesized preference for external numerical flexibility is perhaps too crude 
as employers use different ways to restructure the workforce – this applies in both 
rounds. However, a comparison of aggregate figures of work share programs between 
Denmark and Germany does indicate a Danish preference for external flexibility.
The 2009 interviews revealed that the severity of redundancies did not change union 
practice on concessionary bargaining on wages for production workers to save jobs. 
Salaried workers, however, did agree to wage freezes. Nonetheless, shop stewards were 
willing to look at working time – both through work share programs but also working 
time reductions which bore with them de facto reductions in income. 
In order to increase employability of redundant workers, shop stewards have pushed 
for extra training during redundancies to a lot larger degree in 2009 than in 2007. More-
over, they have tried to negotiate favorable redundancy payments for senior employees 
but with varying success due to managerial reluctance in one of the three companies. It 
is unclear how much this raises the costs of firing for employers. The change in union 
attitude to redundancies and income security is underlined by the recent agreement to 
introduce redundancy payments for senior employees in the manufacturing collective 
agreements. 
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Conversely, there has been no change in the rejection of industrial action as a means 
to avoid redundancies. Indeed, general levels of industrial action during collective agree-
ments have dropped in the period. 
In conclusion, it seems that flexicurity compromises of the ‘Golden Triangle’ have 
indeed been strained by the economic crisis. Moreover, practice varies across companies 
which somewhat confirms the hypothesis of varied responses across versions 1 and 2. 
This shows how compromises between social partners are in constant flux and contin-
gent upon the immediate employment at hand which in turn alerts to the dangers of 
building analytical models based on relatively short periods of stability. 
The ‘Golden Triangle’ – while definitely still very relevant – seems in need of comple-
mentary concepts which this article has tried to introduce with ‘centralized decentraliza-
tion’ – a concept that directs our attention to forms of flexibility and security belonging 
to industrial relations regulation and practice at both sector and company level. Using 
these complementary versions of flexicurity, responses to restructuring can hopefully be 
approached in a more nuanced manner. 
Cross-country comparison may, nonetheless, reveal that Danish restructuring 
practices are relatively persistent despite the above mentioned signs of changes. More 
research into these country-specific differences during times of change might further 
our understanding of the interrelationships between labor market models and industrial 
relations practice. 
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End note
1  Traxler (1995) has termed the process ‘controlled decentralization’ to indicate how sector 
level agreements remain in place to work as frame work agreements while the actual set-
ting of primarily wages and working time are determined at the workplace but within the 
frames set at sector level. 
2  On acceptance of local employment councils and social partners the period can be extended 
for an additional 13 weeks.
3  Figures are based on the last quarter of 2009 while the unemployment was still on the rise. 
As mentioned below the unemployment rate for 3F union members in construction and 
manufacturing was as high as 12 % in the beginning of 2010.
4  Increases are measured as the change – in percent – from last year wage level.
